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Abstract This perspective discusses nine conditions for
enhancing the performance of multistakeholder partnerships
for sustainable development. Such partnerships have
become mainstream implementation mechanisms for
attaining international sustainable development goals and
are also frequently used in other adjacent policy domains
such as climate change, health and biodiversity. While
multistakeholder arrangements are widely perceived as a
positive contribution to addressing global change, few
studies have systematically evaluated the existing evidence
for their positive performance. This poses an urgent and
important challenge for researchers and practitioners to
understand and improve the effectiveness of partnerships, in
particular since their popularity increases despite their past
track record. The recommendations presented are based on
own research, a literature survey and discussions with a large
number or international Civil Society Organizations at two
occasions during 2014. This article proceeds as follows: first,
we define multistakeholder partnerships, outline their
rational and summarize available assessments on
partnership success; second, we provide a set of concrete
recommendations based on lessons-learned from over
10 years of scholarship; and third, we conclude with some
reflections on the future of multistakeholder governance for
sustainability.
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INTRODUCTION
As decision-makers continue to struggle with providing
adequate solutions to pressing global environmental challenges
such as climate change, biodiversity loss, deforestation, and
natural disasters, calls for innovative approaches to ‘navi-
gate the Anthropocene’ (Biermann et al. 2012), which
challenge the hierarchical state-led model of governance
(Hajer et al. 2015) are getting louder. Proponents argue that
coalitions and cooperation between government agencies,
business actors, and civil society will increase the likeli-
hood to stay within a ‘safe operating space for humanity’
(Rockstro¨m et al. 2009) as new collaborative arrangements
are expected to forge more efficient, effective, and inclusive
responses to global policy problems. In the area of climate
change, for example, recent scholarship has scrutinized the
emergence of a loosely coupled regime complex (Biermann
et al. 2009; Keohane and Victor 2011; Zelli 2011) that
shows features of a polycentric governance architecture
(Cole 2015). A particularly popular arrangement within this
broader trend has been multistakeholder partnerships,
which have played a crucial role in implementing sustain-
able development goals ever since the 2002 World Summit
on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. More than
340 partnerships for sustainable development were conse-
quently registered at the United Nations (Andonova and
Levy 2003), and the ‘partnership approach’ is currently
being emulated in many other issue areas of global gover-
nance, such health, water governance, and climate change.
While bottom-up transnational multistakeholder
arrangements are widely perceived as a potential contribu-
tion to addressing global change, recent studies find little
evidence for positive performance. This poses an urgent and
important challenge for researchers and practitioners to
understand and improve the effectiveness of partnerships, in
particular, since their popularity only seems to increase
despite their mixed track record. It is also a particularly
timely quest given that the year 2015 comprises high-profile
negotiations taking place on the Post-2015 Development
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Agenda: the Hyogo Framework of Action on natural hazards
and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC).Within the context of the latter, demand
for a more structured engagement of the UNFCCC with
bottom-up transnational arrangements is building up (Chan
and Pauw 2014; Widerberg and Pattberg 2015).
In this perspective, we argue that lessons learned from
evidence-based assessments of transnational multistake-
holder partnerships should urgently be taken into account
when designing or re-designing existing transnational mul-
tistakeholder arrangements. We identify nine conditions for
improved performance arranged across three overarching
themes: actors (leadership, partners); processes (goal setting,
funding, management, monitoring); and contexts (meta-
governance, problem structure, and sociopolitical contexts).
The nine conditions have been identified by carrying out a
systematic review of research on transnational multistake-
holder partnerships in the field of sustainable development.
The nine conditions have been distilled from the literature
by clustering the explanatory factors for success or failure in
transnational multistakeholder partnerships identified from
the scholarly literature. The review has been complemented
by input from some of the world’s largest Civil Society
Organizations (CSOs), to which we presented our study and
discussed the results at two separate occasions during 2014:
first at a workshop with CSO Strategy Directors collabo-
rating under the umbrella of the International Civil Society
Center (ICSC); and second, during the 2014 Global Per-
spectives conference arranged by the ICSC in collaboration
with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD).
This article is structured as follows. The first section
defines transnational multistakeholder partnerships, pro-
vides a brief history of their emergence, and assesses their
performance to date. In the second section, we identify nine
conditions for success of multistakeholder arrangements
and provide policy-advice. The final section concludes with
some reflections on the future role and relevance of poly-





Identifying the precise unit of analysis when assessing the
performance of transnational partnerships is challenging.
Practitioners and scholars have used the term ‘partnership’
to describe just about any type of collaboration between
state and non-state actors. Also the vast and growing lit-
erature on public–private partnerships suffers from
conceptual confusion, competing definitions, disparate
research traditions, and a normative and value-laden
agenda of promoting partnerships. This state of conceptual
vagueness has led some scholars to describe the term
partnership as ‘‘conceptually empty and merely politically
expedient’’ (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2011, p. 31).
Despite the lack of a broadly agreed definition, most
scholars agree about the constitutive features of multi-
stakeholder partnerships at the global level, most notably:
transnationality (involving cross-border interactions and
non-state relations); public policy objectives (as opposed to
public ‘‘bads’’ or exclusively private ‘‘goods’’); and a
network structure (coordination by participating actors
rather than coordination by a central hierarchy). Following
Scha¨ferhoff et al. (2009, p. 455), we define transnational
multistakeholder partnerships as ‘‘institutionalized trans-
boundary interactions between public and private actors,
which aim at the provision of collective goods.’’ Finally,
we understand ‘performance’, ‘success,’ and ‘effective-
ness’ in terms of problem-solving capacity of partnerships
to address the issue they have set out to solve.
The rationale behind multistakeholder partnerships
Multistakeholder partnerships at the global level emerged
during the 1990 s as a new and innovative governance tool
vis-a`-vis traditional intergovernmental cooperation through
treaty-making and have become part and parcel of many
countries’ developmental strategies. They are now being
employed as governance instruments in issue areas ranging
from environment, health, and development cooperation to
social rights and security (Scha¨ferhoff et al. 2009). The
emergence of transnational multistakeholder partnerships
can be traced back to the 1992 Earth Summit, where
Agenda 21 called for a ‘‘Global Partnership for Sustainable
Development’’ and alluded to multistakeholder partner-
ships between ‘‘public, private and community sectors’’ to
boost implementation (UNCED 1992). A decade later, the
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in
Johannesburg reiterated the message, and the so called
Type II or Johannesburg partnerships were created. More
recently, in 2012, at the United Nations Conference on
Sustainable Development (Rio ? 20), the central role of
partnerships was emphasized in the outcome document:
‘‘The Future We Want’’ (Pattberg and Mert 2013). Con-
sequently, multistakeholder partnerships have become
integral to global environmental governance from the
perspective of governments and are likely to remain so in
the implementation of the SDGs, the emerging new climate
change regime and other issues areas.
Advocates of multistakeholder partnerships emphasize
their flexible, adaptive, and decentralized nature, whereas
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critics object to the market-based narrative and argue that
partnerships are a neoliberal construction invented to
increase the power of private interest in global affairs, in
particular in the developing world (Zammit 2003). Some
even claim that UN-sponsored partnerships are a way to
invite special interest into the UN, boost corporatism, and
allow the private sector to make use of the UN’s good
name while merely paying lip-service to the goals they set
out. For example, the UN’s Global Compact, which is the
UN’s high-profile corporate governance partnership, has
repeatedly been accused of ‘‘blue-washing’’ meaning that
corporations make use of the UN’s good name by signing
up to a number of principles they never intend to follow
(Bruno and Karliner 2000). What is more, some developing
countries have also been weary of giving partnerships too
much attention and consequently accused developed
nations of shifting responsibility for funding away from
traditional Official Development Assistance (ODA).
While debates about the pros and cons of multistake-
holder partnerships continue, they have proliferated in a
number of issue areas. The empirical evidence of this trend
is the found in multiple existing registries and databases on
partnerships. A well-studied registry was set up in con-
junction with the 2002 WSSD and administered by the
UN’s Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD). At
its peak, it included over 340 entries (today that number is
down to 1961). The first registry has been succeeded by the
SD in Action Registry which applies a somewhat broader
definition of partnerships than the original registry, cur-
rently listing 1400 voluntary actions and commitments. A
more recent registry was set up in 2014 after the Third
International Conference for Small-Island Developing
States (SIDS) where nearly 300 multistakeholder partner-
ships were announced. Interestingly, a similar process is
taking place in the climate-change regime where a web-
portal for Cooperative Initiatives has been created to show
case climate initiatives submitted by countries and obser-
vers to the Secretariat to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (UNFCCC
2014). Mirroring the SD in Action Registry, a homepage
for Non-state Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA)
was launched in end 2014 at the 20th Conference of the
Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC with over 1000 entries of
‘‘Cooperative and Individual Actions on Climate Change in
Partnership with Countries’’ (UNFCCC 2015). A large
number of the actions registered in the sustainable devel-
opment and the climate change registries do not qualify as
partnerships according to our definition; however, it serves
as a clear indication of new governance mechanisms
increasingly being applied by governments.
Key findings on the past performance
of multistakeholder partnerships
In the context of an increased use of transnational multi-
stakeholder partnerships in global environmental gover-
nance, a key concern for policy-makers and academics alike
is their overall limited effectiveness (Andonova and Levy
2003; Zammit 2003; Hale and Mauzerall 2004; Bo¨rzel and
Risse 2005; Glasbergen et al. 2007; Bitzer et al. 2008;
Vollmer 2009; Andonova 2010; Pattberg 2010; Ba¨ckstrand
2012; Pattberg et al. 2012; Beisheim and Liese 2014).
Individual partnerships such as the GAVI Alliance that
enhances the dissemination of immunization or the standard-
setting Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) have proven
highly effective in problem-solving (Pattberg 2005; Pattberg
2007; Beisheim and Liese 2014). On the whole, however,
concluding from recent analyses of the WSSD sample,
partnerships have a limited track-record in terms of effec-
tiveness (Scha¨ferhoff et al. 2009; Pattberg et al. 2012). The
analysis of WSSD Partnerships draws four conclusions.
First, on analyzing the sample of 340 partnerships after
more than five years since inception, approximately 38
percent show low levels or no measurable output. More-
over, roughly 42 percent (86) of the partnerships with
measurable output engage in activities without direct
relation to their publicly stated goals and ambitions (see
Fig. 1). Summing up, of these numbers, 211 partnerships
are inactive, lack any outputs, or fail to match their stated
ambition with their observed activities (see Fig. 1).
Second, partnerships fail to deliver on the promises
rehearsed by many of their advocates. They are not filling
governance gaps left open by governments with new
norms. Nor do they foster implementation of existing
intergovernmental regulations to a significant degree.
Finally, partnerships fail to foster inclusiveness and par-
ticipation of previously marginalized actors in global
governance. Figure 2 illustrates this continued marginal-
ization of key stakeholders (in particular the UN major
groups) by showing the number of partners from a specific
sector in the total partnership sample (Ba¨ckstrand 2012,
pp. 252–253). So far, critics to the partnership approach
arguing that it is simply a tool for powerful actors to
consolidate power seem vindicated. However, as Fig. 3
indicates, since a majority of partnerships are led by
international organizations and state agencies and not by
business actors, the partnership approach cannot easily be
subsumed under a ‘‘privatization of governance’’ framing.
Third, the analysis finds that most partnerships appear to
lack the organizational capacity, resources, and trans-
parency to implement their goals. A mere 15 % indicate a
budget plan, 23 % have office space, 30 % seem to have
staff members, and 5 % disclose a memorandum of
understanding (Pattberg et al. 2012, pp. 257–258).1 http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?menu=1500.
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Fourth, multistakeholder partnerships are ‘‘not just neutral
instruments for implementing internationally accepted sus-
tainability norms, such as theMillenniumDevelopmentGoals
and Agenda 21, but rather sites of contestation over distinct
technologies and practices’’ (Mert and Chan 2012, p. 40). On
the contrary, some act as vehicles for controversial technolo-
gies—including nuclear energy, biotechnologies, biofuels,
PVC, and vinyl—to gain UN-level recognition to name a few.
The limited success of multistakeholder partnerships in
terms of problem-solving leaves room for improvements.
In the next section, we discuss nine conditions for
improved performance.
NINE CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL
MULTISTAKEHOLDER PARTNERSHIPS
As discussed above, the performance of multistakeholder
partnerships can be improved. To this end, we have iden-
tified nine conditions for success frequently encountered in
the literature on multistakeholder partnerships. First, the
relevance of actors and their specific resources, identities,
and histories; Second, the relevance of process manage-
ment: and third, the relevance of the problem-structure and
broader ‘‘situational context’’ (Visseren-Hamakers et al.
2007). Table 1 provides an overview of the features of the
Fig. 1 Partnership output related to publicly stated goals and ambitions (Source Pattberg et al. 2012 and own calculations)
Fig. 2 Number of partners from different sectors (Source Pattberg et al. 2012)
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nine conditions for success and the key literature used
throughout this survey, which supports the observations.
The following sections elaborate on each of the condi-
tions and provide recommendations for decision-makers.
Actors
Partners
Multistakeholder partnerships are essentially manifesta-
tions of networked governance which in turn is charac-
terized by resource exchange. To find the appropriate mix
of resources, knowledge and capabilities are thus by defi-
nition necessary to exploit synergies and an effective
division of labor. For such networked governance to suc-
ceed, one needs the combined willingness, capability, and
resources of partners, in particular, engagement from the
most powerful and influential members (Beisheim 2012;
Newell et al. 2012). Moreover, creating an optimal mix
requires attention in the partner-search, and omitting
powerful and important stakeholders can lead to subopti-
mal performance (Gray 2007, p. 36; Wigell 2008). A
particularly salient issue was frequently raised as a topic
during our consultations with CSOs, namely, the challenge
Fig. 3 Number of partnerships led by partners from a specific sector (Source Pattberg et al. 2012)
Table 1 Selection of key literature per condition for success
Conditions for success Key literature
Actors
1. Optimal partner mix Beisheim (2012), Newell et al. (2012) and Gray (2007)
2. Effective leadership Glasbergen (2010), Abbott and Snidal (2010) and Gray (2007)
Process
3. Stringent goal-setting Liese and Beisheim (2011), Abbott et al. (2000) and Keohane and
Victor (2011)
4. Sustained funding Martens (2007), and Reinicke et al. (2000)
5. Professional process management Liese and Beisheim (2011), Szulecki et al. (2011), Aylward et al.
(2003)
6. Regular monitoring, reporting, and evaluation to support
organizational learning
Wigell (2008) and Ba¨ckstrand (2012)
Context
7. Active meta-governance Biermann et al. (2009), Derkx and Glasbergen (2014) and Glasbergen
et al. (2007)
8. Favorable political and social context Stringer et al. (2014) and Beisheim and Liese (2014)
9. Fit to problem-structure Miles et al. (2001), Abbott (2012) and Keohane and Victor (2011)
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of power-asymmetries between members. Large power-
asymmetries in terms of sheer financial and human
resources and information can be detrimental to trust
among members from different sectors of society. To
address partner challenges, it could be useful to map
partners’ values and identities; to devise counter-argu-
ments and common points of interest; and to identify where
bargaining could be successful and not successful. Finally,
transparency is key to building trust and mitigating power-
asymmetries and should thus be promoted by engaging the
members in open and transparent communication, deci-
sion-making, and evaluation.
To enable an optimal mix of partners, it is necessary to
conduct a detailed and thorough assessment of needs (what
partners would be needed to induce change?) and match it
with the prevalent values and identities of potential
partners.
Leadership
Leadership by both individuals and organizations is by
many considered a key ingredient, and during the course of
the partnership’s life-time, different types of leadership are
needed. The start of a partnership needs an entrepreneur or
broker (Glasbergen 2010), ‘‘convener’’ (Gray 2007), or
‘‘orchestrator’’ (Abbott and Snidal 2010). They fill the
functions of bringing people to the table, mitigating
diverging opinions, and driving the difficult start-up pro-
cess forward.
While good leadership is recognized as an important
feature of successful partnerships, it remains difficult to
operationalize. Most observers simply note that leadership
is essential yet provide little information on the conditions
for effective leadership and means to foster it. Neverthe-
less, it remains critical to identify and manage the different
types of leadership needed for the partnership to succeed.
Process
Goal-setting
Beisheim and Liese argue that the effectiveness of multi-
stakeholder partnerships partly depends on the ‘‘precision
of norms’’ (2011) or, in other words, on how ambitious and
stringent the goals have been set. High levels of precision
limit the room for interpretation, while lower degrees of
precision allow for discretion and interpretation. In many
cases, rules are so vague and broad that they impede
compliance, monitoring, reporting, and evaluation, and
consequently limit accountability and transparency. Precise
rules and goals also have a stabilizing and reassuring effect
on governments and firms to invest resources when trying
to achieve the goals of the partnership (Keohane and Victor
2011). An emerging challenge is to foster coherence in the
international norm system to avoid, what Biermann et al.
have called ‘‘conflictive fragmentation’’ (2009). Goals
should therefore be aligned with international norms.
Finally, Visseren-Hamakers et al. also connect trust
building and improved collaboration to the level of con-
sensus regarding strategies and goals, which in turn
increases the likelihood for success (2007, p. 163). Hence,
goal-setting is not only about the end product but also the
way in which goals were set in a collaborative and inclu-
sive process.
For goal-setting to succeed, it is important to have a
good process in place. This includes developing a common
vision and goals from the very outset, working toward a
common problem-definition, and aiming for the clear and
measurable goals. Moreover, a mapping of the compati-
bility between a partnership’s goals and other related pro-
cesses (e.g., SDGs, CSR, human rights) reduces the risk of
conflictive fragmentation (Biermann et al. 2009).
Funding
As the governance of sustainable development is arguably
moving away from multilateral treaties and implementation
via state-based agencies and programs, authors have
warned against more unstable streams of funding as
financing is increasingly provided through voluntary and
‘‘ultimately unpredictable’’ goodwill from private finan-
ciers (Martens 2007, p. 5). However, there is little evidence
that governments are more likely to sustain a constant
stream of funding than, for example, private funders such
as foundations, and it is plausible to think that funding
shortages can be actively managed. Governments are by no
means the only source of income since, while private ini-
tiatives and foundations are becoming wealthier and per-
haps increasingly important for providing common goods,
as is the case, for example, in global health governance. It
nevertheless highlights the need for adequate funding.
Sourcing funds has thus become an increasingly important
task for managers. There is no template for what funding
model that works best. Successful organizations have
employed a number of approaches, for example, limiting
funding coming from one source, relying on membership
fees or voluntary funding from the members, and fun-
nelling money generated from activities back to the orga-
nizations (Reinicke et al. 2000). In sum, securing funding is
more of an issue for multistakeholder partnerships than for
traditional implementation programs.
Management
A robust finding of partnership research is that effective-
ness and good process management are related (Liese and
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Beisheim 2011). While it is hardly surprising that effective
and efficient internal organization is conducive for the
organizational goals to be met, in many cases, inadequate
resources, time, and thinking are spent on managerial
aspects. While the verdict is still out on what type of
governance structure that optimizes effectiveness, some
studies indicate that a small governing board of major
donors, supported by a secretariat and room for input by a
select group of affected stakeholders, is favorable for a lean
and effective process management and decision-making
(Liese and Beisheim 2011). Common strategic plans, clear
division of roles and responsibilities, and multilevel forums
to coordinate funding and resources have been identified as
effective management structures (Aylward et al. 2003).
Also smart management measures taken on a local level are
found to facilitate success.
A frequent observation is that having full-time staff
employed is conducive to effectiveness (Szulecki et al. 2011;
Beisheim 2012). According to these studies, a high level of
institutionalization with formal organization and bureaucracy
is thus preferable to a loosely coupled network structure with,
for example, a hosted secretariat within an already existing
organization. However, there needs to be a balance between
the level of institutionalization and the amount of red-tape.
Existing institutions should be used as far as possible to avoid
becoming a new institution or agency by limiting their
bureaucracy’s work to only the essential coordination tasks
(Reiniecke et al. 2000). Szulecki et al. also find that orga-
nizational characteristics such as a strong ‘corporate identity’
appear to be correlated with effectiveness (2011).
A good management structure includes staff focusing
exclusively on partnership tasks, hiring staff with man-
agerial experience to occupy key positions, ensuring
effective communication between the process managers
and key partnership members, as well as among the part-
nership members. Moreover, to avoid internal conflicts, we
recommend creating dispute-settlement mechanisms.
Monitoring, reporting, evaluation, and learning
Monitoring, reporting, and evaluation practices among dif-
ferent multistakeholder partnerships vary substantially.
While some arrangements publicly disclose annual reports,
third party evaluations, and meeting documents, others
barely report on meeting agendas and participants. However,
we argue that a robust and open monitoring, reporting, and
evaluation system to record progress and processes will have
a positive effect on the performance of multistakeholder
partnerships for three main reasons. First, it enables orga-
nizational learning. Institutions have proven more effective
when they are able to adapt quickly to new circumstances
(Folke et al. 2005). Second, both public and private con-
stituencies are increasingly demanding accountability and
disclosure of spending and impacts of financial or in-kind
contributions. Third and finally, monitoring, reporting, and
evaluation are needed to enhance transparency, which in
turn is instrumental for process legitimacy (Wigell 2008;
Ba¨ckstrand 2012; Gupta and Mason 2014).
Consequently, a transparent and regular monitoring and
reporting program is conducive and even necessary to




A surge in alternative governance arrangements such as
multistakeholder partnerships outside the traditional inter-
national institutions is an indicator of an emerging property
of fragmentation in global governance which is character-
ized by uncoordinated and non-hierarchical institutional
arrangements, often leading to functional overlap and
competition among initiatives and norms (Biermann et al.
2009). Fragmentation could have negative effects on the
governance architecture in the shape of inefficiencies and
conflicting norms, goals, and policy processes. To mitigate
the risk of ‘‘conflictive fragmentation’’, multistakeholder
partnerships should consider meta-governance, i.e., ‘‘the
organisation of self-organisation’’ or ‘‘regulation of self-
regulation’’ (Derkx and Glasbergen 2014). Research high-
lights two important aspects. First, goals of multistake-
holder partnerships should be checked against a number of
criteria to determine their conduciveness to, for example,
the key principles of the UNFCCC, the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD), the Hyogo Framework for
Action, and other international policy goals. Second, if they
are to be incorporated into the formal regime and given a
‘‘seal of approval’’ from the UN, then there should be a
bureaucracy with the mandate and power to vet new ini-
tiatives against set criteria, in particular to avoid what has
been described as ‘‘blue washing.’’
To promote good meta-governance, goals should be
checked against a number of minimum criteria for their
conduciveness to the SDGs and other sustainable devel-
opment-related goals (e.g., climate change 2 target). We
also recommended to carefully map the broader gover-
nance architecture in which the partnership is situated and
consequently liaison with other partnerships, organizations
and institutions working with related problems.
Political and social context
Multistakeholder partnerships interact with numerous
international, national, and local institutional frameworks
with an impact on sustainable development, and thus add to
48 Ambio 2016, 45:42–51
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a dense patchwork of existing institutions. Consequently,
the political and social context will influence the chance to
succeed. For example, national production and consump-
tion patterns, views of ruling elites, or geographical posi-
tion could be major factors determining the outcome of a
partnership. The political and social context is important at,
at least, two levels. First, the political and social context is
relevant at the level of the actual governance architecture.
Building on Visseren-Hamakers et al. we note that part-
nerships can have three functions vis-a`-vis the wider gov-
ernance architecture: if functions are filled that support
multilateral regimes, they are complementary; if functions
are filled that used to be carried out by governments, they
erode public authority; and, if functions are fulfilled in a
new manner, they reinvent politics (Visseren-Hamakers
et al. 2012). Second, those partnerships with implementa-
tion at the local level are highly dependent on local con-
ditions. This can be used to complement the benefits of the
governance arrangement. For example, best practices from
multistakeholder partnerships in developing countries show
the importance of learning and building on local institu-
tional and governance structures when delivering common
goods. It has also been shown that institutional capacity
building was needed, in particular, in countries with a
violent past (Stringer et al. 2014).
Mapping the governance architecture and the social and
political context in which a multistakeholder partnership is
situated is central to understanding the opportunities and
challenges to implementation. It increases the possibility
for tailor-made solutions rather than a ‘‘one-size fits all’’
approach. In some cases, local capacity building to create
the institutional conditions for implementation, taking into
account local conditions, is a necessary strategy to pave the
way for a successful arrangement (Beisheim and Liese
2014, 208).
Problem-structure
A final intervening variable that determines the likelihood
of a successful partnership is the structure of the problem at
hand. A range of researchers have argued that ‘‘malign
problems’’ characterized by high levels of complexity,
competing interests, and unclear solutions are less likely to
be solved than ‘‘benign problems’’ where actors’ interests
and preferences converge, and solutions are easier to
identify (e.g., Miles et al. 2001). It is thus important to
control for problem-structure when measuring the success
of a partnership. In addition, when designing a partnership,
it is therefore important to recognize that every problem
has distinct features with specific administrative problems
and political constituencies and thus requires different
institutional setups (Abbott 2012; Keohane and Victor
2011). Problem-structure may, however, be malleable.
Scientific discovery might reduce uncertainties in deciding
what measures would be appropriate and thereby assist in
building a business-case for addressing a policy issue.
Ultimately, it is important to investigate whether a
multistakeholder partnership is the most appropriate solu-
tion to the problem at hand, or if there are other, more
promising avenues that can be explored.
CONCLUSIONS
In this perspective, we provided guidance on how to
improve the performance of transnational multistakeholder
partnerships for sustainable development by learning from
past experience. It is a salient topic, as multistakeholder
partnerships are increasingly utilized not only to implement
global sustainable development goals such as the SDGs but
also to feature prominently in adjacent issues areas such as
climate change, biodiversity, and natural disasters.
Nine conditions have emerged from our analysis deter-
mining the success of a multistakeholder partnership. It
suggests that in future design, implementation, or evalua-
tion of partnerships, these aspects should be considered and
taken into account throughout all stages of the partner-
ship’s process. For instance, the problem-structure and
social and political contexts will determine whether part-
nerships are the best means of implementation for the issue
at hand. In the start-up phase of a partnership, entrepre-
neurial leadership and a proper goal-setting process is
therefore needed. In addition, transparent procedures,
adequate management skills, active monitoring and
reporting, and sustained funding and feedback-loops for
higher-level learning are essential for creating success.
The findings reported in this perspective also point to a
number of shortcomings in existing research, and conse-
quently indicate directions for future research. First, the
temporal dynamics of transnational partnerships have not
received sufficient attention. How is the universe of mul-
tistakeholder partnerships changing over time? Which
arrangements serve only strategic purposes and which are
further institutionalized into solid organizations? Who is
driving changes over time? A second research lacuna is the
question of how the nine conditions for success interact
with each other. Are there conceivable trade-offs between
the conditions? Are certain combinations more important
than others? And finally, empirical research should scru-
tinize whether some conditions are more or less important
for a specific type of partnership.
On a final note, while the logic behind transnational
multistakeholder partnership is attractive for addressing
complex sustainable development problems, they have yet
to reach their full potential. Moreover, the failure to sig-
nificantly enhance participation and inclusiveness in global
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governance through multistakeholder partnerships also
provide critics with evidence of their ‘‘dark side.’’ How-
ever, research could help in identifying areas for
improvement and potential pitfalls and provide an evi-
dence-based review for a way forward. Over the coming
year(s), there will be important steps to be made toward
implementing the SDGs, reversing biodiversity loss and
deforestation, and mitigate greenhouse gases. And there are
already calls and proposals for changing the meta-gover-
nance of partnerships to improve their effectiveness. For
instance, Chan and Pauw (2014)—supported by a group of
scholar and think-thanks—have suggested a Global
Framework for Climate Action (GFCA) to address many of
the shortcomings observed in the sustainable development
arena. A GFCA would support the mobilization of alter-
native governance arrangements such as subnational and
city initiatives on climate change, by providing brokerage,
visibility, and legitimacy. In return, arrangements such as
multistakeholder partnership would be required to report
on their progress and be subjected to more monitoring than
presently the case. Chan and Pauw’s (2014) suggestion is a
laudable attempt to improve the overall global governance
of sustainable development issues and could be seen as an
indication of how the international arena is trying to deal
with suboptimal performance of alternative governance
arrangements. However, these calls for more overall syn-
ergies can only be realized if the building blocks, i.e., the
individual governance arrangements, are designed and
implemented in ways that enable their success. We hope
that our discussion of nine conditions for success can
provide such guidance for improving the performance of
multistakeholder partnerships.
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